I was doing my usual I’m board thing on stumble upon, surfing through various web pages, with the scripting turned off.<\/p>\n
Then I reached this one, and it wanted to send me a file. No big deal why not … I’m protected I’m running linux. You have to chmod +x <filename> to make it executable, and the extension wasn’t .desktop.<\/p>\n
So I opened it up with less:
\n<\/p>\n
\r\nFrom rms@gnu.ai.mit.edu Tue May 2 02:36:22 1995\r\nReceived: from mole.gnu.ai.mit.edu by iris3.carb.nist.gov via SMTP (920330.SGI\/920502.SGI)\r\n\tfor ram id AA19490; Tue, 2 May 95 02:36:22 -0400\r\nReceived: by mole.gnu.ai.mit.edu (8.6.12\/8.6.12GNU) id CAA07516; Tue, 2 May 1995 02:37:30 -0400\r\nDate: Tue, 2 May 1995 02:37:30 -0400\r\nMessage-Id: <199505020637.CAA07516@mole.gnu.ai.mit.edu>\r\nFrom: Richard Stallman\r\nTo: ram\r\nIn-Reply-To: <9505020440.AA19150@iris3.carb.nist.gov>\r\n\t(ram@iris3.carb.nist.gov)\r\nSubject: Re: etc\r\nStatus: RO\r\n\r\nHere's a proposal for another way to support musicians.\r\nThis way would not do the job for software, because users\r\nneed to be able to change software as well as copy it.\r\nBut users don't have much use for modifying phonorecords,\r\nso music is a simpler problem, and this way seems sufficient.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n The Right Way to Tax DAT\r\n\r\n Richard M. Stallman\r\n\r\n Record company magnates don't like the digital audio tape recorder\r\n(DAT), which can make perfect copies of musical recordings. They fear\r\nthat customers will copy music themselves, and stop buying prerecorded\r\nmusic.\r\n\r\n Threatening lawsuits, they have obtained from the manufacturers of\r\nDATs an agreement to pay a fee for each DAT unit and each DAT tape sold\r\nto consumers. This fee is to be divided among various participants in\r\nthe music business: musicians, composers, music publishers and record\r\ncompanies. In addition, DAT manufacturers have agreed to cripple DAT\r\nunits so that they cannot make a copy of a copy of a prerecorded piece.\r\n\r\n Now the record companies have asked Congress to enact a law turning\r\nthis fee into a tax and prohibiting manufacture of DAT tapedecks that\r\nfunction without imposed limitations.\r\n\r\n The stated purpose of the tax is to \"compensate\" musicians for\r\ncopying done by individuals using DATs. However, 57 percent of the\r\nfunds collected would go to record companies and music\r\npublishers--leaving less than half to the people who participate in the\r\ncreative process. Most of these remaining funds would go to musical\r\nsuperstars, and thus would do little to encourage musical creativity.\r\nMeanwhile, DAT users would be unable to make full use of the power of\r\nDAT technology.\r\n\r\n Here is a proposal for a different system for taxing DATs and DAT\r\ntape--one designed to support music rather than cater to vested\r\ninterests.\r\n\r\n * Collect funds with a tax on DAT machines and DAT tapes, as the\r\n current proposal provides.\r\n\r\n * Use a survey system to measure the extent of copying of each\r\n musical piece.\r\n\r\n * Distribute these funds entirely to the people who create music.\r\n\r\n * Adjust each contributor's share so that it increases more slowly\r\n per copy as it gets larger. This spreads the funds more widely to\r\n support a larger number of musicians adequately.\r\n\r\n * Make no restrictions on the functioning of DATs.\r\n\r\nWhat is the purpose of copyright?\r\n=================================\r\n\r\n The record industry presents its proposal as a way to \"compensate\"\r\nmusicians, assuming that they are entitled to be paid for any copy made.\r\nMany Americans believe that copyright law reflects a natural right of\r\nauthors or musicians--that these are entitled to special consideration\r\nfrom public policy. However, any lawyer specializing in the field knows\r\nthis is a misunderstanding, a view rejected by the American legal\r\nsystem.\r\n\r\n The stated purpose of copyright, given in the U.S. Constitution, is\r\nto \"promote the progress of science and the useful arts\". Progress in\r\nmusic means new and varied music for the public to enjoy: copyright is\r\nsupposed to promote a public good, not a private one.\r\n\r\n Yet copyright is often thought of as a natural right by laymen and\r\npoliticians, which often leads to wrong decisions about copyright\r\npolicy. Even courts, defining the details of the copyright system,\r\noften let this thought creep back implicitly even though it is supposed\r\nto be excluded. This is a conceptual error because it mistakes a means\r\n(copyright) to a larger end (progress) for an end in itself.\r\n\r\n Promoting progress in the arts does not inherently justify the idea\r\nthat authors are entitled to any particular sort of copyright, or even\r\nthat copyright should exist at all. Copyright is justified if the\r\nbenefits of progress exceeds the burden that copyright imposes on\r\neveryone except the copyright holder.\r\n\r\n How do we make this cost\/benefit comparison? It depends partly on\r\nfacts (how does a particular law affect musical activity and music\r\nusers) and partly on our value judgements about those results.\r\n\r\n Let's assume that it is worth paying a DAT tax if the result is a\r\nsignificant increase in musical activity, and investigate how we should\r\narrange the details of this tax in order to maximize the benefit. But\r\nfirst, let's review basic principles and facts which have a bearing on\r\nthe inquiry.\r\n\r\nDiminishing returns\r\n===================\r\n\r\n The law of diminishing returns is a general principle of economics.\r\nIt states that each additional increment of efforts or funds spent on a\r\ngiven goal typically produces a smaller and smaller increment in the\r\nresults. There are exceptions to this law, but they are local; if you\r\nkeep on increasing the inputs, you eventually leave the exceptions\r\nbehind.\r\n\r\n For example, you can make traffic flow more smoothly by improving\r\nroads. Adding one lane to 20 miles of congested roads in a city might\r\nincrease the average traffic speed by 15 miles an hour. Adding a\r\nsecond lane to those roads will not give the same improvement; this\r\nmight increase the average speed by only 5 more miles an hour. The\r\nnext additional lane might make no noticeable difference if the traffic\r\njams are already gone. Yet each successive lane will cause greater\r\ndislocation as more and more buildings must be torn down to make room.\r\n\r\n When applied to the activities of musicians, diminishing returns\r\ntells us that each successive increase in the income of musicians will\r\nhave a smaller effect on the amount of creativity in music.\r\n\r\n Diminishing returns is the first reason to reject the idea that any\r\nuse of music \"should\" be covered by copyright. There is nothing to gain\r\nby trying to guarantee owners control of every possible aspect of the\r\nuse of music or to give them a financial stake in every possible\r\naftermarket. Extending copyright can only \"promote progress\" up to a\r\ncertain point. Further extensions merely increase what the public pays\r\nto the owners for what they will do anyway. Extending copyright beyond\r\nthat point is certainly undesirable.\r\n\r\nTrade-offs\r\n==========\r\n\r\n Those with a vested interest in extending copyright start the\r\ndiscussion by claiming that copyright \"should\" be extended as far as it\r\ncan go. But the principle of diminishing returns renders this claim\r\nimplausible. So they fall back on the position that copyright should\r\nbe extended to maximize the rate of progress. But this too is wrong,\r\nbecause it ignores the existence of other trade-offs. Copyright\r\nimposes costs and burdens on the public, like any other government\r\nproject. The benefit may not be worth the price.\r\n\r\n Government fills many important functions, but few would say that any\r\none of these functions should be expanded to maximize output. For\r\nexample, governments build roads, and this is very useful. But few\r\nleaders would advocate building every road that could be built. Road\r\nconstruction is expensive, and citizens have other uses for their money.\r\nToo much concentration on building roads means that other social and\r\nindividual needs will be unmet.\r\n\r\n The same considerations apply to individual decisions. By spending\r\nmore money, you can buy a bigger and fancier house. Most people would\r\nprefer the more expensive house, all else being equal. But given\r\nfinite resources, at some point spending more on a house becomes a poor\r\nallocation of them.\r\n\r\n Copyright does not directly spend public funds, but it does impose a\r\ncost--a loss of freedom--on every citizen. The wider the scope of\r\ncopyright, the more freedom we pay. We might prefer to exercise some of\r\nour freedoms rather than trade them away. We must judge any decision in\r\ncopyright policy by comparing the benefits with the costs.\r\n\r\n*Incentive* is the wrong concept\r\n================================\r\n\r\n The idea of providing a monetary incentive for making music is based\r\non a misunderstanding. Musicians hope primarily for other kinds of\r\nreward; they must. Very few musicians get rich from their music; a\r\ntalented person whose primary goal is wealth would seek it in other\r\nways.\r\n\r\n In fact, psychological studies show that the desire for an extrinsic\r\nreward (such as profit) generally hampers creative activities such as\r\nwriting music. The people who can do them well are usually those who do\r\nthem mostly for their own sake.\r\n\r\n This is not to say that musicians don't care about being paid. Most\r\nhope to make a living from music so they will be free to devote their\r\ntime to it. As long as they earn enough to live, they will make music\r\nas best they can. We might wish them to earn somewhat more than just\r\nenough, so they can live as well as most Americans. But to offer them\r\nwealth beyond this gains the public little--it is a matter of\r\ndiminishing returns.\r\n\r\n With this understanding, let's consider how a tax on DAT tape could\r\nbe designed to serve the intended purpose of copyright.\r\n\r\nWho should get the funds\r\n========================\r\n\r\n If the purpose of the DAT tax is to better reward musicians and\r\ncomposers, then all the money collected should go to them--not just 43\r\npercent. The musicians and composers are the ones who truly create the\r\nmusic. In principle, we could do without record companies entirely.\r\n\r\n Record companies do provide a useful service: they distribute\r\nprerecorded copies of music, usually of high quality. This service is\r\nwidely used, and will probably remain so. And it is right that the\r\npurchasers of prerecorded copies should pay for this service. But\r\nlisteners making copies for themselves or their friends do not consume\r\nthis service; they use only the work of the musicians and composers.\r\nThe record companies contribute only incidentally and their role is not\r\nessential.\r\n\r\nDividing the funds\r\n==================\r\n\r\n What share of the tax revenues should each musician or composer get?\r\nThe record company proposal would divide the money in proportion to\r\nrecord sales.\r\n\r\n It makes sense to distribute the funds based on how much that\r\nmusician's work is copied, more or less. But strict proportionality is\r\nnot the best apportionment. If each musician gets a share in strict\r\nproportion to the amount of copying of his or her music, then a large\r\nshare will go to make a few superstars even richer than they are now.\r\nThis won't do much to promote musical culture or diversity.\r\n\r\n We can promote music more effectively by making any one musician's\r\nshare of the tax revenues taper off as copies increase. For example,\r\nwe could calculate an \"adjusted number of copies\" which, beyond a\r\ncertain point, increases more slowly than the actual number.\r\n\r\n The effect of tapering off will be to spread the money more widely,\r\nsupporting more musicians at an adequate standard of living. This\r\nencourages diversity, which is what copyright is supposed to do.\r\n\r\n The US government has already established a program to fund\r\ndiversity in the arts: the NEA. However, NEA grants involve\r\ndiscretionary power, which makes them a center for controversy,\r\nsometimes because a few members of the public strongly dislike the\r\nwork, and sometimes because hardly anyone particularly likes it.\r\nSpreading out DAT tax revenues will also have the effect of supporting\r\nless popular musicians. However, it will not support musicians whose\r\nwork nobody likes. In addition, since it involves no discretion, no\r\narbitrary decisions, there is little room for objection on account of\r\nany particular case.\r\n\r\nEncouraging home copying\r\n========================\r\n\r\n The record company proposal includes a requirement to make it\r\ndifficult for home listeners to make copies. Specifically, it requires\r\nthat consumer DAT machines refuse to copy a copy that was made on a\r\nconsumer DAT machine. The argument for this requirement is based on\r\nthe assumption that home copying is somehow unfair.\r\n\r\n In the past, many people have considered it unfair, because it\r\nreduced the income of musicians. The DAT tax makes this reason\r\nobsolete. Once home copying does contribute to the income of\r\nmusicians, through the DAT tax, the reason to discourage home copying\r\ndisappears.\r\n\r\n Therefore, if a DAT tax is adopted, the ability to copy DAT tapes\r\nshould not be restricted. Home copying is more efficient than record\r\ncompanies and record stores; music lovers should be encouraged to use\r\nhome copying as much as possible.\r\n\r\nMeasuring the use of each piece of music\r\n========================================\r\n\r\n Today, nearly all the recorded music in the United States is\r\npurchased in record stores; home copying is but a small fraction. This\r\nwill probably remain true for a long time, because record stores offer a\r\nplace where a person can go to find a particular piece or to browse a\r\nwide selection. While this remains true, we can usually estimate the\r\naudience of a given piece fairly well by counting record sales.\r\n\r\n Eventually, home copying may become so widespread that estimating its\r\nextent from sales figures may be unsatisfactory. This is already\r\nunsatisfactory for musicians who distribute independently without the\r\nhelp of record companies; and if any musicians need additional support,\r\nthese are the ones. We need another way to estimate usage of any given\r\npiece, in order to distribute the tax funds.\r\n\r\n We can make these estimates by survey. From time to time, survey\r\nstaff would ask randomly chosen members of the public to show what\r\ncopies they have made of copyrighted music. The citizens asked would\r\nnot be required to answer. But no penalty and no guilt would attach to\r\nhaving made copies, so most people will be glad to participate. Fans\r\nwill hope to be chosen so that they can contribute to the count for\r\ntheir favorite musical groups.\r\n\r\n To make the survey more efficient and broader-based (and thus more\r\naccurate), it could be automated. The survey bureau could mail\r\nread-write memory cards to the chosen participants, who would connect\r\nthem momentarily to their DAT units and then mail them back. With\r\nproper design, the survey bureau would have no way of knowing who had\r\nsent in any particular card, and thus no information about who had\r\ncopied what, but they would still have an accurate total.\r\n\r\nConclusion\r\n==========\r\n\r\n The record companies have proposed an excellent scheme for taxing the\r\npublic to increase their own income, but this isn't a legitimate purpose\r\nof copyright. Through due attention to the ends of copyright rather\r\nthan past means, we can design a system which supports musicians while\r\ngiving citizens full freedom to copy music as they wish.\r\n\r\nWhat You Can Do\r\n===============\r\n\r\n Record company lobbyists are working hard to pass their form of DAT\r\ntax. There is little organized opposition, and little public debate.\r\nTheir bill has already been sent out of committee in the Senate.\r\n\r\n This article proposes an alternative to the record company plan. In\r\norder for this alternative, or any alternative, to have a chance, we\r\nmust first prevent the hasty adoption of the record company plan. To\r\nhelp accomplish this, please write letters to:\r\n\r\n Congressman Barney Frank\r\n 437 Cherry St\r\n West Newton, MA 02165\r\n \r\n Senator Metzenbaum\r\n United States Senate\r\n Washington, DC 20510\r\n \r\n House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property\r\n House of Representatives\r\n Washington, DC 20515\r\n\r\n Urge Congress to reject the record company bill so that this and\r\nother alternatives can be properly considered. It takes just a few\r\nminutes to write a short letter, but in combination with other people's\r\nletters it can do a great deal of good.\r\n\r\n If you know any musicians, composers, or songwriters, give them\r\ncopies of this article. Many musicians prefer this alternative to the\r\nrecord company tax plan, and they are strongly motivated to act on their\r\nconcern.\r\n\r\n [Copyright 1992 Richard M. Stallman\r\n Verbatim copying in any medium is permitted without fee\r\n provided the copyright notice and this notice are preserved.]\r\n\r\n<\/rms><\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" I was doing my usual I’m board thing on stumble upon, surfing through various web pages, with the scripting turned off. Then I reached this one, and it wanted to send me a file. No big deal why not … I’m protected I’m running linux. You have to chmod +x <filename> to make it executable, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-393","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-things-that-get-me-mad"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.the-erm.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/393","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.the-erm.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.the-erm.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.the-erm.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.the-erm.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=393"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/blog.the-erm.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/393\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":394,"href":"https:\/\/blog.the-erm.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/393\/revisions\/394"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.the-erm.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=393"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.the-erm.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=393"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.the-erm.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=393"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}